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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the timing of earnings announcement and the direction and 
magnitude of earnings for more than 2482 firm-years in the Bursa Malaysia. The results confirm that CEOs time 
their earnings announcement based on the direction and magnitude of the unexpected earnings. CEOs announce 
earnings early for positive unexpected earnings, and delay the announcement for negative unexpected earnings. 
The market reacts to the timing of the announcement accordingly. These findings are relevant and useful to 
judge company performance by observing the announcement date of the company, especially those that perform 
less than satisfactorily in anticipation of bad news release from these firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The theory of earnings conservation and management, that is, whether bad news in financial 
statements is captured faster than good news, has been a relevant study in accounting and 
finance. Timing the disclosure of information has become an important decision to be made 
by the chief executive officers (CEOs) of listed firms. While CEOs may want an optimal 
disclosure time, it is questionable whether this timing strategy is effective for earnings 
announcement. Earnings announcements have been widely accepted as highly regular and 
predictable events. The announcement effects have been proven to be strongly correlated 
with share price revaluation. On the other hand, the Efficient Market Hypothesis has also 
postulated that “timing” per se cannot affect securities prices, as all information including 
timing is already imbedded into the securities prices prior to the date of announcement. 
However, earnings conservation and management appear to be a common practice of 
financial reporting. Indeed, regulators and standard setters have expressed strong concern 
over its widespread practice. The Malaysia Accounting Standard Board (MASB) has stated 
that firms must announce their earnings within a time frame from their financial year-ends. 
Evidence has shown that firms normally announce their earnings on an average of three 
months after the financial year-end.  
The history of formal financial accounting and reporting in Malaysia is fairly short 
when compared to the more developed economies, spanning a period of only three decades. 
The development and advancement of accounting standards only began in the late 1970s, 
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and most of the approved standards were initially mere adoption of International Accounting 
Standards (IASs). While some improvements were noticeable in recent years, the current 
reporting practices are largely based on and strongly influenced by statues, such as the 
requirements of the Companies Act and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) or 
Bursa Malaysia listing requirements. As such, not much has changed over the years in terms 
of the reporting format and the disclosure practice. Nevertheless, many listed companies 
were recently fined by Bursa Malaysia for delayed disclosure and their names published in 
local newspapers. Is this a new development in efforts by Bursa Malaysia to improve 
corporate covenant, or is it due to improvement in earnings management by public listed 
companies? 
This paper examines the “timeliness effect” in terms of the duration of the 
announcement from the financial year-end, and their respective unexpected earnings and 
share price revaluation. Unexpected earnings are the actual earnings less the expected 
earnings calculated from the previous year’s earnings using the naïve model. The findings 
are important to settle the issue that the direction and magnitude of the unexpected earnings 
are relevant parameters as reported by Cheng et al. (2001). The authors provided evidence 
that investors in Bursa Malaysia revalue firms’ share prices in terms of direction and 
magnitude of their earnings, sometimes by as much as one is to one magnitude. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Studies on earnings management using timing behavior have been carried out widely 
including the United States (Basu, 1997; Lara et al., 2005), the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany (Lara and Mora, 2004) and China (Haw et al., 2000). 
Chen and Mohan (1994) surveyed 3,090 companies to determine whether managers 
placed much significance on the timing of earnings announcement. They reported that about 
half of the firms maintained a fixed earnings announcement schedule, whereas another half 
adjusted their announcement dates. Firms that varied their announcement timing 
reported that unexpected earnings levels have the most impact on the timing of their 
decision. Lower-than-expected earnings or negative unexpected earnings were more likely 
than higher-than-expected earnings to prompt a change in timing. These findings are 
important in empirical research on timing of annual reports, especially studies on why 
managers behave in a manner contradicting the efficient market theory. 
Sinclair and Young (1991) examined the association between the timeliness of half-
yearly report for Australian firms and the abnormal stock price behavior around the time of 
the announcement. Their results show that reports containing “good” news were released 
earlier than reports containing “bad” news. 
Haw et al. (2000) studied the timeliness of annual report release and market reaction to 
earnings announcement in China. They found that firms with good news released their 
annual reports earlier than firms with bad news, that is, firms with losses released their 
annual reports late. They also observed a significant price reaction to annual earnings 
announcements for both early (good news) and late (bad news) reporting firms. Their results 
are consistent with Chambers and Penman (1984) and Bagley and Fisher (1998) that firms 
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unexpectedly accelerate the release of good news and delay the disclosure of bad news 
relative to their previous reporting pattern. 
Lara et al. (2005) investigated the effect of earnings management on the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings. They examined earnings conservation from a timing perspective. 
They interpreted conservatism as capturing accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree 
of verification for recognizing good rather than bad news in earnings. 
The reasons CEOs behave in the manner reported in the above studies are possibly due 
to (1) the “stakeholder theory” and (2) “internal reporting hypothesis”. The “stakeholder 
theory” suggests that in the absence of an opportunity to hide bad news, because of the 
mandatory disclosure requirements, CEOs have turned to delaying their release (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). Alternatively, the “internal reporting hypothesis” maintains that CEOs 
are concerned about internal evaluation, which will affect their compensation (Kross, 1982). 
CEOs may require more time to prepare responses, or announce it together with good news 
that come along. The above literature confirms the timing behavior of the CEOs, but there is 
little study on the subject in Malaysia. This paper examines the timing behavior of 
Malaysian firms which will hopefully assist regulators and standards setters to erect 
appropriate rules and regulations for more transparency in reporting. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Design 
 
This study is designed to determine whether the timing of earnings announcements and 
earnings changes affect the direction and magnitude of stock price revaluation. The standard 
event study method was applied in the study. 
 
 
1. Analysis of Abnormal Returns 
 
Sharpe’s Market Model (Sharpe, 1963) was used as a standard general equilibrium 
relationship for asset returns. Abnormal return (AR) is: 
 
(1)  ARit = Rit − [αi + βi Rmt]  
 
where ARit is the abnormal returns of firm i at time t. Rit = ln (Pit/Pit-1) and Rmt = ln (It / It-1), 
where, in addition to terms already defined, ln is natural logarithm, Pit is the stock price of the 
firm i at time t, and It refers to the market’s composite index at time t. The market parameters 
αi and βi are estimated as ordinary least square regression parameters over trading periods, 
−60 months to −3 month relative to the announcement month. Returns are adjusted for thin-
trading bias using Fowler-Rorke’s method (Fowler and Rorke, 1983). The resulting risk-
adjusted abnormal returns of each observation at any time over the test window is added and 
averaged across all the observations to obtain the arithmetic average abnormal return (AAR). 
The average abnormal returns over t = 1 to T is then cumulated as:  
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where, CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return and AARit is the average abnormal 
return for firm i at time t. 
The accumulation is carried out over a price reaction window of −50 to +1(CAR 50), and 
–1 to +1(CAR 1), consistent with other studies for testing the statistical significance of the 
returns (Cheng, et al., 2001; Arif et al., 1997). 
 
 
2. Analysis of Unexpected Accounting Earnings  
 
Unexpected earnings are computed using the naive expectation model, which assumes that 
the next period’s expectation is simply the current period’s earnings. This is also consistent 
with the design of the study to investigate the contemporaneous effect of price change at a 
point in time. Raw unexpected earnings (RUE) are computed using the naive model:  
 
(3)  RUEit = Eit − Ei(t−1) 
 
where RUEit is the raw unexpected earnings of firm i at time t and Eit  is earnings for firm i at 
time t. The unit normal variables are estimated as follows:  
 
(4)  SUEi = RUEit/σ(UEi)  
 
where SUEi is standardized unexpected earnings for firm i, and σ(UEi) is standard deviation of 
unexpected earnings.  
This transformation, which mitigates the effect of changing variance or 
heteroscedasticity on the variables, yields unexpected value of earnings variable adjusted for 
volatility differences, σ(UEi). 
 
 
3. Analysis of Shift in the Earnings Announcement Dates 
 
This paper uses two measures on the dates of announcement. The first measure (1) is the 
days of announcement from the year-end dates (DYE) and (2) is the days of announcement 
from the mean announcement dates, which is the unexpected shift in earnings 
announcement dates (UAD). 
Unexpected shift in earnings announcement dates are computed using current period’s 
earnings announcement dates less the previous period average announcement dates. The 
values are either negative or positive, where negative means a shift to earlier announcement 
and positive means a delay in announcement. This is also consistent with the design of the 
study to investigate the contemporaneous effect of price change at a point in time. 
Unexpected earnings announcement dates (UAD) are computed as follows:  
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(5)  UADit = ADit − MADi(t−1)  
 
where UADit is unexpected announcement dates for firm i at time t in days, ADit is 
announcement dates for firm i at time t in days, and MADi(t−1) is average announcement 
dates for firm i at time t−1 days. 
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
1. Grouping Stocks into Quartiles.  
 
Grouping the data according to unexpected announcement dates helps to reduce the effect of 
the disturbance term which is large in individual stocks. This leads to an increase in the 
estimated t-test at group level. Grouping is one approach that has been used to reduce the 
errors-in-variables problem (Beaver et al., 1979; 1980; 1987; Ariff et al., 1997). 
The portfolios are set up initially by ranking all stocks according to the magnitude of 
their unexpected announcement dates (UAD). To form 4 quartiles, 25% of the stocks with 
the highest UAD ranking are placed in the first quartile. The next highest 25% are arranged 
in the second quartile, and so forth until the fourth quartile which contain the last 25% of the 
observations with the lowest unexpected announcement dates (UAD).  
An independent sample test is then used to test the difference of means for the first and 
the fourth quartile in terms of the days of announcement from financial year-end, the days of 
announcement from the previous mean announcement dates, the raw unexpected earnings, 
the standardized unexpected earnings , the CAR(50) and CAR (1).  
The study includes calculating the correlation coefficients of the unexpected earnings 
and their respective abnormal returns for samples that announce earnings early and samples 
that announce earnings late. The magnitudes of the correlation coefficients are compared for 
any differences.  
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The major hypothesis in this study is that firms unexpectedly accelerate the release of good 
news and delay the disclosure of bad news relative to their previous reporting pattern. The 
abnormal returns will also vary according to the dates of the announcements. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Changes in the unexpected earnings affect changes in announcement 
dates.  
Null Hypothesis: µ1 = µ4. (Where, µ1 is the mean announcement 
dates for quarter 1 firms, and µ4 is the mean announcement dates for 
quarter 4 firms) 
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the mean 
announcement dates of quarter 1 and quarter 4 firms. The null 
hypothesis is rejected when the t-test for equality of means is 
significant, that is, the unexpected announcement dates have 
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different means for early earnings announcement firms and late 
earnings announcement firms.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Changes in announcement dates affect the investors’ valuation of the 
share price in response to the unexpected earnings. 
Null Hypothesis: Correlation coefficients between earnings and 
returns (ρ) = 0, and the t-test is insignificant. 
However, if the correlation coefficients between earnings and returns 
(ρ) is > 0 at 0.05 level, this will provide evidence that investors 
revalue share prices in response to the changes in announcement 
dates.  
 
 
Data 
 
The data used in this study are from the Daily Diary, Investor Digest published by the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange. The data consisting of daily, monthly stock prices, and earnings 
announcement dates were collected from a random sample of 160 firms over the period of 
January 1988 to July 1997. From these firms, a total of 2,482 annual earnings announcements 
were collected. 
 
 
1. Earnings Announcement 
 
The sample period is from January 1988 to July 1997. During this period, no major 
significant event happened in the Accounting Profession, except for:  
 
a. The revision of the Ninth Schedule of the Companies Act in 1985, which 
specifically requires that a statement of source and application of funds be an 
integral part of the financial statement; and  
b. The establishment of Securities Commission under the Securities Commission Act 
1993, and the issuing of Policies and Guidelines on the issue/offer of securities in 
December 1995. The latter contains the corporate disclosure policy, post-listing 
obligations and accounting standards and valuation/revaluation of assets.  
 
Therefore, the sample collected during this period is considered to be “clean” enough 
for analysis. An issue of concern in collecting earnings data is the confounding effect of 
other information such as accounting changes, merger proposals, bonuses or restructuring 
occurring at about the same time as the earnings announcements. This study selected only 
pure earnings announcements for analysis eliminating observations confounded by the 
above. 
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2. Earnings Announcements over January 1988 to July 1997 
 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange’s Daily Diary earnings announcement dates were 
collected for a random sample of 160 firms over the period January 1988 to July 1997. The 
total sample consists of 2,482 annual earnings announcements. 
Table 1, column 2 and 3, shows the monthly frequency distribution of the financial year-
end for all the observations from 1988 to 1997. The distribution shows that 50.2% had the 
financial year-end in December, followed by 25.7% in June, 12.2% in March and 9.1% in 
January. Less than 5% of the firms had financial year-end in the remaining months. 
Comparing the frequency distribution with the actual frequency distribution in the KLSE 
main board (Table 1, column 6 and 7), the two distributions are very close to each other. 
Therefore, the sample is representative of the firms listed on the KLSE main board. 
 
 
Table 1. Monthly Frequency Distribution of Financial Year-end  
for all Observations from 1988 to 1997 
Financial Year-end for Total 
Sample 
Financial Year-end for 
Test Sample KLSE Main Board Month 
Number % Number % Number % 
Jan 226 9.1 38 8.9 33 7.4 
Feb 6 0.2 0 0.0 3 0.7 
Mar 304 12.2 29 6.7 58 13.0 
Apr 91 3.7 5 1.2 18 4..0 
May 28 1.1 5 1.2 4 1.0 
Jun 638 25.7 61 14.2 85 19.1 
July 32 1.3 3 0.7 7 1.6 
Aug 54 2.2 5 1.2 7 1.6 
Sep 59 2.4 4 0.9 10 2.3 
Oct 34 1.4 8 1.8 3 0.7 
Nov 13 0.5 5 1.2 2 0.5 
Dec 1247 50.2 267 62.2 215 48.3 
       
Total 2482 100.0 430 100.0   445 100.0 
 
 
The frequency distribution of all categories of earnings announcement dates by year and 
by month is presented in Table 2, column 2, 3, 7 and 8. There were 200 to 300 
announcements per year. Generally most of the firms made their announcement in March, 
April, May, June and September, the reason being that most firms have their financial year 
ending on 31st December (see Table 1). Therefore they announced their annual year-end 
results three to four months after the financial year-end, that is in March and April.  
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Table 2. Frequency Distribution of Earnings Announcements  
Year to Year Basis Month to Month Basis 
Total Sample Test Sample Total Sample Test Sample Year 
Number % Number % 
Month 
Number % Number % 
88 315 12.7 51 11.9 Jan 49 2.0 4 0.9 
89 226 9.1 48 11.2 Feb 115 4.6 32 7.2 
90 255 10.3 40 9.3 Mar 289 11.6 171 38.9 
91 221 8.9 41 9.6 Apr 388 15.6 84 19.0 
92 209 8.4 53 12.4 May 278 11.2 41 9.3 
93 205 8.3 48 11.2 Jun 267 10.8 10 2.3 
94 209 8.4 39 8.9 July 126 5.1 8 1.9 
95 269 10.8 44 10.3 Aug 149 6.0 20 4.6 
96 259 10.4 39 9.1 Sep 242 9.8 34 7.6 
97 314 12.7 27 6.3 Oct 116 4.7 14 3.2 
     Nov 92 3.7 7 1.6 
     Dec 71 2.9 5 1.2 
          
Total 2482 100.0 430 100.0  2482 100.0 430 100.0 
 
 
The Companies Act 1965 requires all companies to prepare and publish audited financial 
statement latest by six months after the financial year unless special permission is granted by 
the KLSE. However, most firms announced their results earlier and published the financial 
statement later. Table 3 shows the frequency distribution of the earnings announcements after 
the financial year-end. The table shows that 41.0% announced their results between 2–3 
months from the financial year-end, 22.8% between 3–4 months and 13.5% between 4–5 
months. Less than 3.4% of the announcements were released after six months from the 
financial year-end.  
 
 
Table 3. Frequency Distribution of Earnings Announcement based on  
Days after the Financial Year-End (n = 2482) 
Days 0–30 31–60 61–90 91–120 120–150 150–180 >180 
Count 35 260 1018 566 336 182 85 
Percent 1.4 10.5 41.0 22.8 13.5 7.3 3.4 
        
 
 
3. Final Earnings Announcement Test Sample 
 
Imposing the selection criteria described in (1) led to removal of rights, bonus, and special 
issue announcements in order to remove the confounding effects of these non-earnings 
related disclosures. The announcement of financial year-end pure disclosures formed the 
sample consisting of 430 earnings announcements in this study. In forming portfolios by 
ranking the earnings, cases with zero values are identified and excluded from the portfolios; 
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the final sample consisted of 430 observations.  
Table 1, column 4 and 5, shows the frequency distribution of the test sample annual 
earnings announcement by their financial year-end. The table indicates that 62.2% of the test 
sample has financial year-end in December, followed by 14.2% in June and 8.9% , 6.7% in 
January and March respectively. Very few firms have financial year-end in other months. 
The frequency distribution of the test samples annual announcement dates by month and 
year is shown in Table 2, column 4, 5, 9 and 10. There were about 40–50 earnings 
announcement selected for each year, indicating an even distribution throughout the years 
1988 to 1997, except for 1997 where fewer test samples were obtained as they were collected 
only up to July 1997. 
For months, the percentage announcements vary from 0.9% (January) to 38.9% (March). 
The percentages for the rest of the months are 19.0% in April, 9.3% in May, and less than 
10% for the rest. This distribution as compared with the total sample from Table 1 is similar 
in terms of frequency. 
A total of over 2,482 earnings announcement observations were collected for the 10-
year test period. From the above large sample, only 430 annual year-end announcements 
were selected for analyses after applying strict selection procedures to remove confounding 
effects to produce pure observation samples.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 4 (Panel A) shows the descriptive statistics for the days of announcement from the 
financial year-end, the unexpected earnings and the cumulative abnormal returns of the test 
sample. The days of announcement from the financial year-end (DYE) have a mean of 89 
days (approximately 3 months). The standard deviation is 23 days. The minimum number of 
days for firms to declare their year-end results is 36 days, slightly more than a month. The 
maximum number of days for firms to announce their year-end results is 161 days 
(approximately more than 5 months) in this sample. The descriptive statistics also show that 
some firms have shifted the announcement day earlier by 48 days and some have delayed 
their announcement dates from the previous period mean announcement dates by 69 days. 
The raw unexpected earnings have a mean and standard deviation of 2.576 cents per share 
and 10.918 cents per share respectively. The minimum raw unexpected earnings of firms is 
−40.7 cents per share (loss). The maximum raw unexpected earning is 50.2 cents per share 
(gain). The 50 days risk adjusted cumulative abnormal earnings has a mean and standard 
deviation of 0.4% and 11.2% respectively. The minimum risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
return is −36.1% and the maximum risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal return is 35% during 
earnings announcement. The risk adjusted cumulative abnormal returns on the day before 
and after the announcement varies from −14.5% to 12.5%. The firms in this sample can 
have a 14.5% drop or 12.5% increase in their share price over the three days window. The 
mean and standard deviation of the earnings per share are 23.2 cents per share and 22.2 
cents per share respectively. The raw earnings per share vary from −37 cents per share (loss) 
to 106 cents per share (gain) for the test sample during these periods. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Days of Announcement, Unexpected Earnings and 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Full Test Sample (Panel A),  
1st Quartile (Panel B) and 4th Quartile (Panel C) 
Panel A: Full Test Sample: n = 430 
Indices Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
DYE 89 23 36 161 
UAD 0 15 −48 69 
RUE 2.586 10.918 −40.700 50.200 
SUE 0.291 0.903 −2.590 3.106 
CAR50 0.004 0.112 −0.361 0.350 
CAR1 0.002 0.035 −0.145 0.125 
EPS 23.20 22.20 −37.00 106.40 
 
Panel B: 1st Quartile (Early Announcements): n = 104 
Indices Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
DYE 78 14 36 123 
UAD −16 9 −48 -6 
RUE 3.816 8.194 −20.800 49.500 
SUE 0.412 0.857 −2.125 2.812 
CAR50 0.034 0.115 −0.236 0.339 
CAR1 0.008 0.033 −0.078 0.104 
EPS 21.00 18.90 −13.00 100.10 
 
Panel C: 4th Quartile (Late Announcements): n = 104 
 Indices Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
DYE 113 23 57 161 
UAD 19 15 6 69 
RUE 0.964 10.667 −36.900 43.000 
SUE 0.132 0.838 −2.590 2.383 
CAR50 −0.024 0.115 −0.306 0.276 
CAR1 −0.003 0.034 −0.082 0.114 
EPS 17.90 21.20 −15.30 101.50 
Indices:  DYE  = the number of days from announcement dates to Financial year-end dates 
 UAD  = the number of days between the announcement dates to the previous mean 
announcement dates 
RUE  = Raw Unexpected Earnings = this year earnings minus last year earnings 
SUE  = Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
CAR(50)  = Cumulative Abnormal Returns from −50 to +1 days 
CAR(1)  = Cumulative Abnormal Returns from −1 to +1 days 
EPS  = Earnings Per Share 
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Table 4, Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of the 1st quartile of the test sample. 
The 1st quartile consists of 104 firms that announce earnings earlier by 6 to 48 days from the 
previous average announcement dates (mean announcement dates). These firms announce 
their earnings from 36 to 123 days from their year-end dates. Their mean UAD is 16 days 
earlier than their mean announcement dates or 78 days from the year-end dates. These firms 
have a mean EPS and raw unexpected earnings of 21 and 3.816 cents per share respectively. 
The CAR50 and CAR1 are 3.4% and 0.8% respectively 
Table 4, Panel C, shows the descriptive statistics of the 4th quartile of the test sample. 
The 4th quartile consists of 104 firms that have delayed their earnings announcement. The 4th 
quartile firms delay their earnings announcements by 6 to 69 days from their previous 
average announcement dates or they announce their earnings from 57 to 161 days from their 
year-end dates. Their mean UAD is 19 days later than their mean announcement dates or 
113 days from the year-end dates. These firms have a mean EPS and raw unexpected 
earning of 17.9 and 0.964 cents per share respectively. The CAR50 and CAR1 are −2.44% 
and −0.3% respectively. 
Table 5 shows the frequency distribution of the earnings announcement date based on 
the day after the financial year-ends (Panel A) and previous mean announcement dates 
(Panel B). Panel A shows that all firms have announced their earnings within the six months 
period stipulated by the accounting standard. The firms announce their earnings between 2 
to 3 months is 58.1%, 3 to 4 months is 31.3%, 4 to 5 months is 9.0%, 1 to 2 months is 8.6% 
and follow by 5 to 6 months  at 1.4%. Table 5, Panel B  shows  the frequency distribution of  
 
 
 
Table 5. Frequency Distribution of Earnings Announcement based on Days after the 
Financial Year-end (Panel A) and Mean Announcement Date (Panel B) 
Panel A: Days after Financial Year-end: n = 430 
Days 0–30 31–60 61–90 91–120 120–150 150–180 >180 
Number 0 37 250 135 39 6 0 
Percent 0.0 8.6 58.1 31.3 9.0 1.4 0.0 
        
 
Panel B: Days from the Mean Announcement Dates: (n = 430) 
Days 
−48 to −20 −20 to −10 −10 to −1 0 1 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 69 
Number 27 45 141 35 122 26 23 
Percent 6.2 10.5 32.8 8.1 28.3 6.0 5.3 
        
 
 
firms that announce their earnings early and later than their previous mean announcement 
dates. Most of the firms have maintained their announcement dates within ten days from 
their previous mean announcement dates (70%). Some of the firms (16.7%) have 
announcements earlier by more than 10 days and some (11.3%) have delayed their 
announcement by more than 10 days.  
Table 6 summarizes the independent samples test for the 1st quartile (firms that 
announce earnings early) and the 4th quartile (firms that announce earnings late). The results 
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show that the days from the announcement dates to the financial year-ends have a t-value of 
−13.087, which is significant at 0.000 level. Similarly, the t-statistics for the days of 
announcement from their previous mean announcement dates is −20.258, significant at 
0.000 level. The raw unexpected earnings and the standardized unexpected earnings have t-
statistics of 2.165 and 2.381 respective which are significant at 0.05 level. The 50-days risk-
adjusted cumulative returns (CAR50) have a t-statistic of 3.605, significant at 0.000 level. 
The t-statistics for CAR1 is 2.445, significant at 0.05 level. All the above results indicate 
that the t-test reject the null hypothesis of equal means, which suggest that the firms that 
announce earnings early are different from the firms that announce earnings late in terms of 
their unexpected earnings and the share price revaluation. The magnitudes are such that the 
firms that announce earnings early have a higher raw unexpected earning (RUE) and larger 
cumulative abnormal return for both long (CAR50) and short (CAR1) windows. The t-
statistics for EPS is 1.122, and a p-value of 0.263, which is not significant at 0.05 level. In  
 
 
Table 6. Independent Samples Test For 1st Quartile (Early announcement firms) and 4th 
Quartile (Delay announcement firms) Samples: t-test for Equality of Means 
Indices Mean Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference t-values 
Signficant (2-
tailed) p-values 
     
DYE −35 2.668 −13.087 0.000*** 
UAD −35 1.735 −20.258 0.000*** 
RUE 2.852 1.317 2.165 0.032* 
SUE 0.280 0.118 2.381 0.018* 
CAR50 0.057 0.016 3.605 0.000*** 
CAR1 0.011 0.005 2.445 0.015* 
EPS 0.031 0.028 1.122 0.263 
Note: Significant at p=0.05 (*), p=0.01 (**), and p=0.001 (***) levels.  
For details of indices, please refer to Table 4.  
 
 
other words, firms that announce earnings early or late are not influenced by the level of 
earnings per share. They based their decision on the raw unexpected earnings and the 
standardized unexpected earnings. The investors will then revalue their share accordingly. 
This is consistent with the literature in developed markets that CEO time their earnings 
announcement dates based on the direction and magnitude of their earnings. Malaysian 
CEOs are behaving in the same way as managers in other developed countries, as suggested 
by either the “stakeholder theory” or the “internal reporting hypothesis” where they delay 
announcing bad news.  
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Table 7. Correlation Coefficients between Unexpected Earnings and 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns. 
Panel A 
Correlation Coefficients between RUE with CAR(50) and CAR(1) 
Sample n RUE with  CAR (50) t-values 
RUE with  
CAR (1) t-values 
Early announcement 
 
205 
 
0.295 
 
4.40*** 0.327 
 
4.96*** 
Delayed announcement 
 
181 
 
0.245 
 
3.38*** 0.164  2.22* 
 
Panel B 
Correlation Coefficients between SUE with CAR(50) and CAR(1) 
Sample n SUE with  CAR (50) t-values 
SUE with  
CAR (1) t-values 
Early announcement 
 
205 
 
0.334 
 
5.06*** 0.290 4.32*** 
Delayed announcement 
 
181 
 
0.268 
 
3.74*** 0.158 
 
 2.14* 
Note: t-values are significant at p=0.05 (*), p=0.01 (**), and p=0.001 (***) levels 
 RUE = Raw Unexpected Earnings = this year earnings minus last year earnings 
SUE = Standardized Unexpected Earnings  
CAR(50) = Cumulative Abnormal Returns from −50 to +1 days 
CAR (1) = Cumulative Abnormal Returns from −1 to +1 days 
 
 
Table 7 shows the correlation coefficients between the unexpected earnings and 
cumulative abnormal returns for firms that announce earnings early and firms that announce 
earnings late. Table 7, Panel A, shows that the correlation coefficients between the raw 
unexpected earnings (RUE) with CAR(50) and CAR(1) are 0.295 and 0.327 respectively for 
firms that announce earnings  early. Their t-values are 4.40 and 4.96  respectively  which are  
significant at 0.000 level. However, for firms that announce earnings late, the correlation 
coefficients between raw unexpected earnings with CAR(50) and CAR(1) are 0.245 and 
0.164 respectively. The t-value for correlation coefficient of 0.164 is 2.22, significant at 
0.05 level only. Table 7, Panel B, shows that the correlation coefficients between 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) with CAR(50) and CAR(1) are 0.334 and 0.290 
respectively for firms that announce earnings early. Their t-values are 5.06 and 4.32 
respectively which are significant at 0.000 level. However, for firms that announce earnings 
late the correlation coefficients between standardized unexpected earnings with CAR(50) 
and CAR(1) are 0.268 and 0.158 respectively. Therefore, firms that announce earnings late 
have consistently smaller correlation coefficients between the unexpected earnings and the 
abnormal returns. These results provide evidence that investors value early earnings 
announcements and response weakly to late announcements. The reasons may be due to (1) 
the lower unexpected earnings in late announcement, (2) investors have already adjusted 
their expectation or (3) more non-earnings information was released prior to the earnings 
announcement thereby resulting in a lesser announcement effect. The results in this section 
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confirm that although CEOs time their earnings announcement based on the direction and 
magnitude of their firms’ unexpected earnings, investors are however, intelligent enough to 
price their shares according to their own interpretation of the financial results. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the timeliness of the annual report announcements of Malaysian 
firms in relation to the direction and magnitude of their unexpected earnings, and the 
reaction of the market to the announcements. The study concludes that the direction and 
magnitude of the unexpected earnings differ significantly between firms that release their 
annual reports early and firms that release their annual reports late. Market reaction to their 
releases also indicates their differences in terms of the values of the risk-adjusted 
cumulative returns.  
The findings in this paper are that Malaysian CEOs announce positive unexpected 
earnings early and negative unexpected earnings late. In the absence of an opportunity to 
hide bad news, because of the mandatory disclosure requirements, Malaysian CEOs have 
turned to delaying their announcement of negative unexpected earnings. Alternatively, the 
Malaysian CEOs are concerned about internal evaluation, which will affect their 
compensation. Malaysian CEOs require more time to prepare their responses in the hope of 
announcing them together with good news that might come along. This study confirms that 
Malaysia CEOs have a set timing behavior which is little different to their overseas 
counterpart. 
For the investors, they react significantly to the timing of the announcement of 
unexpected earnings, their response being positive to announcements that are early. Earlier 
studies by Cheng et al. (2001) indicated that investors can price the share value as much as 
one is to one to unexpected earnings. On the other hand, investors react to delayed earnings 
announcements with less vigour and enthusiasm.  
In summary, this paper concludes that the direction and magnitude of earnings released 
by Malaysian firms affect the timing of the annual report. The market then reacts to the 
announcements accordingly. This study adds to the existing literature on financial reporting, 
as it documents the timing behavior of Malaysian firms listed in the Bursa Malaysia which 
was not available earlier. Further, this study also established the direction and magnitude of 
earnings that affect the timing behavior of Malaysian firms, together with the response of 
the investors to them. Based on this study, it is suggested that the MASB should streamline 
the timing of annual report announcements in line with our emphasis on better corporate 
covenant in public listed companies.  
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